The Problem of Universal Morality

Just as ideas of "moral relativism" have become more widespread among the public, there has been a reaction from intellectuals who have been starting to argue that morality is universal. The leaders of this movement are mostly members of the New Atheist movement which seeks to challenge religion in public life, transcending just a separation of church and state. The New Atheists want to prove that religion has no intrinsic value, that essentially science can replace whatever benefits religion has, or at least what motivations continue its existence. Fellow traveler Michael Shermer, publisher of Skeptic magazine, described religion as shrinking over time as science has been able to give more satisfying explanations for just about everything. The scientific revolution in the 17th century under Bacon, Galileo, and Newton explained the workings of the universe purely by the natural laws of mechanics, contradicting the claims of medieval science. The 18th century enlightenment gave a basis for political authority by human reason. Darwinian evolution explained in the 19th century how all life including human nature itself was the result of blind natural forces, following geology's contradiction of biblical accounts of the age and formation of the Earth. Today the secularist hope is that morality and the purpose of life too can be explained without reference to God or the supernatural.

These thinkers wish to challenge the notion of non-overlapping magisteria, coined by Stephen Jay Gould. Religion and science are said to each be accurate in their own field of human knowledge. As was said in an episode of the Simpsons dealing with evolution, how would you like scientists giving sermons in church? More broadly, for those secular intellectuals suspicious of science, science cannot answer the only questions which really matter, the moral ones. Non-overlapping magisteria was developed by philosophers, and is greatly misunderstood. David Hume formulated an early version, the is-ought distinction. No amount of facts can prove something to be morally right and wrong. Just because it happens doesn't make it good. This itself is a restatement (sort of) of what mothers have told their children. "If everybody jumped of a cliff, would you do it too." Yes it is true that everybody else is doing it, but according to Hume's philosophy there is no certainty that the behavior associated with what you, child, see as good (others do it) necessarily follows. The "good" of their actions depends on something other than the instances of observed behavior. G.E. Moore would expand this idea as the naturalistic fallacy in his Principia Ethica. Reacting against the Utilitarians like John Stuart Mill, he added to is/ought the difference between something which is desired and something that is good. This is important because, going all the way back to Plato's dialogues, many philosophers and psychologists today believe that everybody aims for what they see and as good and do not intentionally do wrong. The Socratic approach is that just as lack of knowledge leads to folly in a given task, lack of knowledge of what is good for the soul is the source of wrong. Modern economics is based on the principle that every individual pursues their self-interest, according to what they desire and how they think they are able to attain it. The problem is that we can desire what is actually bad for us or others unintentionally. If everything desired is good, then there is no way to condemn the sadist because he or she finds what they do desirable.

After is-ought and the naturalistic fallacy where facts about the natural world and feelings of pleasure are not the criterion of moral judgements, what is left? Science appears to be at an impasse, both the natural sciences and psychological accounts of preference cannot account for morality. Neodarwinism can certainly account for how we developed the capacity to make moral judgements and why this ability has stuck around. So science can clarify the facts which are of course used in moral discourse. Much of our arguments about morality do revolve around facts. When I accuse you of stealing, there is the important matter of proving you did indeed steal something. If condemning Barack Obama for saddling our grandchildren with debt, I must prove that he has increased the debt through his actions and describe what those are. And the definitions which we use in moral argument are subject to being true or false. When we approve or disprove of an action, we must explain the basis from which we are criticizing it, whether from an egoistic point of view or an altruistic one. Psychology can explain why we hold certain moral dispositions above others. The methods to convince others of our position can be studied with some objectivity.

What is left is what is important. Why be moral, what makes it moral? My position is that the sciences can go pretty far in explaining reality, but stop short at the most important stuff of thought. Once we figure out what we ought to do, science can take over and do great good. It begins and ends there. We should at the very least acknowledge that ethical propositions are not right or wrong in the way facts are, be it of the natural world or facts about ourselves. This leaves two options. Either morality transcends facts and lies in something like religion or intuition. Or ethical statements are not right or wrong in any sense because they are not based in facts and are just expressions of feeling which add nothing to the truth of a statement. The latter view means the statement you shouldn't kill is just stating the fact you don't like it that some people kill. The ethical part is like adding an exclamation point to a sentence, it doesn't make the sentence any more truthful. This view of ethics, non-cognitivism, would make ethical statements expressions of assent or dissent or commands for others to act upon. I can assert that what is pleasurable is good, but someone else can assert pain is good and not be factually or logically in error. What we are asserting is our preference, even if that preference is say to not live over living. Because all we can talk about are facts, and moral claims are not facts, they are not true or false.

P.1 All we know are true and false are facts
P.2 A moral claim in itself is not a fact
C. Therefore moral claims are not true or false

This position depends on those two premises. If it can be shown that we know more than facts, then my conclusion doesn't follow. But we cannot speak about our knowledge of what cannot proved. What knowledge cannot be proved is private language, accessible to only one person. If you see a slightly different shade of red, and I cannot tell by your observable behavior or physical state, then I must conclude the "fact" that you see a slightly different shade of red nonsense. I cannot describe what it is like to experience color to someone who has been blind their whole life. This is the problem of qualia, purely subjective conscious experience. The way we feel is known to us and can't really be known by others than as an analogy to their own feelings. To say I'm in pain from burning my hand on the stove evokes in you feelings which if I felt them would probably be very similar to what I would feel in that situation. But there is no way of proving this. Quoting Wittgenstein "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

It is with this non-cognitivism, owed to the writings of A.J. Ayer and R. M. Hare which denies moral claims are right or wrong as facts are, that I believe ethics can survive. The non-cognitivist position doesn't necessarily mean ethics is useless and we should become amoral. Rather I believe it forces us to rethink what it means to be moral. Morality is about approval or disaproval of an act. As such most of moral discussion should be about facts. But the stuff of morality lies in our preferences, something which is certainly real, but is outside of being true or false. The preferences we have are just that, preferences. They denote the most important experience we have, perhaps the key to the meaning of life itself. If I do not sound clear on what I mean by preferences or approval being moral, that is my point. Morality is still a problem, because it is only as universal as it is universally agreed upon. Protagoras' quote "man is the measure of all things" is followed by "of what is, that it is; of what is not, that it is not." There are as many moral positions as there are people. If all humans agreed, morality would not be a problem. Thomas Hobbes described the problem thus:

It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociably with one another and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same. To which I answer, 

First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these creatures are not 

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not from the Private; But man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent. 

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do not see, nor think that they see any fault, in the administration of their common business; whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke themselves wiser, and able to govern the Publique, better than the rest; and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civill warre.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall

Because we are not hive minds, because there is disagreement, there is the need for ethics not as finding what we ought to do through ratiocination, but by convincing others to adopt our like and dislikes. All for the purpose of facilitating social life. Universal morality is always going to a problem so long as people are people.

(Update 2/11/17 I still hold a preference view of moral ends, but because I am a scientific realist there are objectively best means to fulfill our preferences. The fact-value/is-ought gap is transcended if facts relate to objectively reality. I´m a moral realist, at least at this point, about means but not towards an ultimate end or preference for our actions.)