Saturday, March 25, 2017

The Praxeological Argument

(From some writings back in 2013)

The praxeological argument against God´s existence. I stumbled upon this idea first by way if an article by the conservative Catholic newspaper The Remnant, called Fury in the Cult of Rothbard which asked whether Austro-Libertatianism which is very popular among certain high profile traditionalist Catholics like Tom Woods and Lew Rockwell is compatible with traditional Catholic ethics regarding social responsibility. The answer was a clear no: a belief in the absolute moral authority of the individual is not reconcilable with social responsibility. There was one part of the article which intrigued me since the major point was already obvious before I read it which related to the overall theme of why libertarianism is not compatible with Catholic social teaching, but did so in a very theologically profound way.

̈Mises’s “praxeology,” a kooky, mechanistic reduction of human action to the relief of “uneasiness” according to a personal subjective value scale of unsatisfied wants and needs, led him (quite logically under his premise) to deny the existence of God. As Mises would have it, an almighty God cannot exist, for such a being would experience no “uneasiness” and thus no impulse to act. (Cf. TCTL , pp. 57-59) ̈

The above quote refers to a passage from the book The Church and the Libertarian published by the folks who bring you The Remnant in the fourth chapter discussing Murray Rothbard ́s guru Ludwig Von Mises ́s hatred of Christianity as a result of his free market views. The paraphrase of the book in the article made a claim about the inherent atheistic or anti-christian parts of his philosophy which changed my theological views forever. The article said that since Mises claimed that a rational being cannot act without a reason, then this means that a perfect being, God, would being perfect have no reason to act and therefore wouldn ́t exist or interfere with the world. Upon reading this I was still open to theistic views and shelved it in my thoughts as interesting but conflicting with the value set I was trying to hold. 

It wasn ́t until later when I started to regain my natural skepticism that I began going over arguments against God again. I started arguing with creationist Republicans, first bringing it up to Karen in a series of texts and an intense facebook argument with that bitch who used to work at WPR whatserface, and brought it up for the first time publicly at the worldview meeting. In the book we were reading, How Now Shall We Live? there was a passage which really made me mad. It had a quote from Oliver Wendell Holmes claiming that man is no more important than a rock or something, to which I objected that not all non religious folks believe. The book was arguing that rationality cannot exist in a world without God. I then unveiled my argument that God cannot be the origin of order in the universe because He would have no reason to create it being all perfect, having all wants fulfilled. I can ́t remember exactly when but before or after this I read on a wikipedia page about arguments against the existence of God on the deductive arguments called the No Reason argument which laid out the praxeological argument based of Mises ́s Human Action. It also mentioned the book God ́s Debris by Scott Adams which takes the exact same ideas of Mises and argues the opposite, that there is a God but that it is not a theistic personal kind of God that created the world. God became the world by destroying itself and so is one with the world.

̈Praxeology revolves around the 'axiom of action,' which serves as the foundation of a rationalist epistemology. The axiom simply states that conscious beings display intentional behavior. It's a fundamental axiom because any attempt to refute it is, in fact, a display of intentional behavior and is therefore self-contradictory. Implied by this axiom is the realization that any action (or intentional inaction) by a conscious being is pursued in an attempt to achieve a goal, and this goal must necessarily be intended to improve things for the actor, or else he would not have chosen such an action (or inaction). That is, every action by a conscious, thinking being is intended to move the being from a less satisfactory to a more satisfactory state.
So what happens when we apply this irrefutable axiom to the idea of a god? Well, monotheistic religions often define their deity, in part, as a perfect being, not lacking in any way. They also claim their deity created reality, and that ' ̃he' created it specifically for the purpose of subsequently creating us mortals.
Interesting.

Perhaps you see the conundrum now. If their god is perfect, then there (by definition) cannot be a state more preferable to him than the one in which he finds himself. If the god was in a less than preferable state, then he would not be perfect in that respect. In fact, a perfect being could not sensibly take any action at all. Any action such a being might take would necessarily be random, thoughtless, non-goal-directed. So it seems that theists are left with two options: either a perfect being created reality but did so entirely by accident, or their god is not so perfect after all (perhaps just a really advanced alien). 

Since it appears that we necessitate a creator, the creator must have had a reason to make us, but a perfect being would have to destroy itself and deny its power to make us. We are then God, the highest part of God which is reason.and are developed over time as part of a process of God realizing its true power and trying to reconcile its power while maintaining a world of limits to allow for free will. This is presented in the Scott Adams (of Dilbert fame) book God´s Debris, which is really an old school philosophical dialogue. The perspective presented is Pan-Deism, God created the universe by becoming the universe. Adams does not argue that Pan-deism is the truth but that it sounds the most logical. Adam´s point is that the simplest explanation, Occam ́s Razor, is not really the most accurate, but sounds the most convincing because humans have such a limited understanding of the world and can only think of delusions, and hold those which are most useful. He subscribes to linguist George Lakoff ́s view that there is no such thing as value free knowledge, and that everything we think we know is framed in what we feel is right. He wants to show us how we can believe in crazy, possibly false ideas like this because they fit our pre-conceived notions of what reality is.

I don´t think the praxeological argument is really an argument against god or gods, but an argument against a certain kind of god(s). It is definitely opposed to Abrahamic theism of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent creator god who intervenes in the world. Now when I came across God´s Debris and Pan-Deism, I thought it was an ingenious solution. I still basically accepted the cosmological argument, that the universe requires a first cause which is uncaused itself in space and time. This all-powerful being purposely committing suicide and becoming the finite world (which is actually infinite as a whole but finite in its particulars) seemed to reconcile a need for a creator god (deism) having the motivation to do so and not interfering in creation. 



Monday, March 20, 2017

Rethinking Group Selection

So this is kind of my meta-political piece which placed my view of politics with a larger understanding of human nature within the natural sciences, particularly biology.

The Neo-Darwinian position is that individual organisms exist as vehicles for the propagation of genes, their own and of those related to them. The survival of the fittest thus is about more than the individual but towards kin too, the fuller view called inclusive fitness. Inclusive fitness is a much more restrictive criteria for certain adaptations which must have benefited the organism's genes. Thus, the altruistic behavior we observe in organisms is at the most basic level toward kin who share genes (our parents and siblings share half their DNA, Uncles/Aunts nieces/nephews grandparents and grandchildren share 25%, first cousins 12.5% and so on) and altruism towards others with the expectation of benefit in the future to one self or relatives. These are respectively kin and reciprocal altruism. Altruism means sacrifice or imposition of costs on the individual for the sake of benefit to another.

The question is whether altruism can be genetically toward a group of those who are not directly related to oneself, as more distant than cousins. There are altruistic species, called eusocial, who have members who exist for the good of the hive and do not reproduce and will sacrifice their life for the hive. These are Hymenoptera, ants bees termites and wasps. Eusocial species are rare, but when achieved can be very successful in terms of numbers as we see with Hymenoptera. These species are eusocial primarily because reproduction is limited to a single queen, so all members of the hive are directly related to one another and are thus still acting "selfishly" for their genes in the big picture.

Group selection has fallen out of favor since inclusive fitness. The incentive for developing group selection is competition with other groups. If certain traits allow the group to outcompete another group for resource conflict, then they will pass their genes on. This is seen as hard to function on a genetic level, as behavior which benefits the group doesn´t often impart genetic benefit to the actor, who may not pass their genes on.

Humans do not limit reproduction to a single pair of people. Couples have their own children and value them above other people's children, and so their altruism is limited and we are more altruistic towards direct relatives than to anybody we happen to live with. At first I did not think that humans were subject to group selection, though because our ancestors in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness most likely lived in small bands of 30-100 people who were probably closely related, they likely followed a coercive altruism imposed by the social group.

I have revised this view. My basic assumptions about human nature are not universal. I used to think, mostly implicitly, that most humans are by nature monogamous or at least pair-bonded given the long time it takes for offspring to develop, the amount of resource investment that takes, and that multiple partners would be expensive before agriculture. I don't think this is universally applicable. This mostly reflects my northwestern European nuclear family ideal.

My realization has been that the nuclear family structure, in which a male invests time and resources to his partner and offspring, is largely a social creation made to solve certain problems. The fundamental family structure is between a mother and her infant, which even the modern welfare has not been able to destroy. But male investment and involvement we have seen can be diminished or destroyed by decades of government policy and is not the same between ethnic groups. That the monogamous nuclear family unit is so fragile to government intervention means that it isn't totally hardwired into our nature.

Research I've seen suggests our prehuman ancestors could have been polygamous, given the sexual dimorphism between males and females we see today. Most human cultures have allowed some form of polygamy, even if most people didn't practice or couldn't afford it. Darwin came up with this hypothesis first studying the gorilla hordes, and Freud made incorporated it into his Oedipal Complex theory.

If polygamy has some basis in our nature and has mattered in our genetic endowment, that means it is possible some people are more closely related than others and this resembles some aspect of eusociality.

The extended family structure is something else that acts, the group in group selection. A genetic force I also came across which can act as group selection is consanguineous marriage, between cousins. This would mean members of a clan are closely related relative to other clans, and would give them more cohesion and interest in one another.

It is the understanding of the extended family and the factor of genetic relatedness for altruism towards the group that brought toward an evolutionary basis for ethnocentrism. Those who appear like us phenotypically are possibly related to us in some way and it would make sense to favor them above others, even if they aren't related to us.

I've thought of some mechanisms in addition to polygamy that would allow group selection to occur. All would have to increase the genetic relatedness of the group over time, relative to other groups. The most simple is reproductive isolation over time. People breeding amongst themselves for hundreds of generations will come to resemble each other genetically and in phenotype more than outsiders. They should favor those who look like them, because they are probably more related to them than other people. This we'd call ethnocentrism. This would work relative to other groups though, as individuals would still be as genetically related to others within their group as outsiders are related to their own ingroup. Presumably people would evolve different traits according to their environmental challenges over time other than just appearance which would differentiate them from other groups:

As humans moved latitudinally away from the equator's tropical climate into colder territory, paternal investment would become greater. Women couldn't gather year round, and men had to take up hunting meat. Those in the colder climate with changing seasons, eurasians, would develop: greater paternal investment, later sexual maturity, less sexual dimorphism, and greater intelligence to survive and plan in the regularly changing environment. Such persons would follow a K-selection reproductive strategy, K for competitive, which emphasizes quality of births over quantity, which is R-selection, R for rate.

Consanguinity, marriage between first cousins, would make individuals more genetically related within the group than strangers within their groups. Polygamy, mostly polygyny of several females to a male, would also produce more genetic similarity and approach something like the eusocial condition of insects who reproduce from a single queen. Even when polygamy is proscribed, it occurs de facto with adultery, bastards, with particularly powerful men, and also divorce where the same man can have several children from different women.

Modern Europeans with proscription of cousin marriage, legal monogamy, and k-selection would have less ethnocentrism than other groups, and the group selection pressures would be more from the environment than from competing with other people. This over time means more exogamy, more individualism, social egalitarianism, moral universalism, more social status for women.

The reality is if those who are of our ethnic or racial group are more related to us than those who aren't, then it is rational to favor them above others and we should expect to have evolved related psychological preferences. The sociobiology presented here means that it is rational to favor ones ethnic/racial ingroup. The political metaphor is the extended family as the larger political unit vis a vie other people.

Kevin MacDonald’s thesis of lower ethnocentrism for Europeans relative to those of the Middle East in the Culture of Critique caught my eye for its major political implications. European, particular northwest European, people have uniquely low ethnocentrism due to environmental challenges in the last Ice Age being the most important factor in evolving group strategies as opposed to competition with other groups, which MacDonald holds creates more ethnocentric cultures, such as in the Middle East.

“Current data indicate that around 80% of European genes are derived from people who settled in Europe 30–40,000 years ago and therefore persisted through the Ice Ages (Sykes 2001). This is sufficient time for the adverse ecology of the north to have had a powerful shaping influence on European psychological and cultural tendencies.”

It is this 80% of DNA from the last ice age going back 40,000 years which is responsible for the difference. The later 20% is a later addition which coincides with agriculture. Groups in the Middle East had pastoralism as a way of life and developed it in competition with other groups. Europeans would have spent most of their evolutionary history on the continent as hunter gatherers, rather than as pastoralists. Being a pastoralist meant having to protect herds from other groups, which would explain higher ethnocentrism. Such resources would be kept within the family, consanguinity, endogamy, the extended family, and also enable polygamy which would altogether make individuals in the group more related. European people would have a lifestyle more dependent on the environment, with a basic division of labor between men and women who would both cooperate as their respective roles hunting and gathering. The changing climate and migration of game would be the challenges to overcome. Monogamy, exogamy, and more of a simple nuclear household would be the norm which mean less genetic relatedness and less ethnocentrism. The Indo-Europeans are the ones who brought pastoralism to Europeans evolved evolved for the environment of the central Asian steppe. Their own kinship and property systems would be transplanted over the hunter gatherers and their evolutionary heritage.

The political consequence is that politics on a large level is a competition between different reproductive strategies. Different ethnic groups are oriented towards different political forms, our political ideology is influenced by ethnocentrism whether we are aware of it or not. White-European people particularly of northwest Europe and their colonial descendants have uniquely low ethnocentrism which manifests in individualist and egalitarian ideologies which face the danger of allowing highly ethnocentric/race-conscious groups to exact rents and come to dispossess white-European peoples. Those groups who favor their own above others have an advantage against those who do not.

Friday, March 3, 2017

Free Will, Determinism, Compatiblism, & Civil Liberty



I hold what's called a compatibilist position on free will and determinism, causal determinism. That means the experience of free will and determinism can be reconciled. This position is called soft determinism. Determinism isn't fatalism, that the future is preordained, just that the present is determined by the past, every effect has a cause. I don't think we're free in the libertarian sense of making autonomous decisions independent of heredity, environment, and past actions. Our actions occur under causality like anything else in the universe we can talk about. I don't take quantum weirdness to mean freedom, just that there is such a thing as probability in the universe. Indeterminism doesn't mean freedom as without a meaningful order of events it isn't possible to plan actions and we aren't free but subject to the arbitrary whim of nature. Freedom means an alternative action can be taken. It is hypothetical, I could have chosen otherwise. Our actions are contingent not necessary, like our very existence. Necessity is logical-mathematical and not factual in nature. Essentially, freedom means we resist changes to our state of motion. Inertia and conservation of our state of matter. By resisting chemical homogeneity with the environment (definition of organism) we are in a way free. An amoeba can be free. Freedom increases with complexity. This means freedom is negative, the absence of impediment to bodily motion, which is Thomas Hobbes' definition. In the social sense freedom is absence of coercion by another agent. I am not free if I am put in irons, though in the political sense I am free if a log falls and traps me underneath since no agent did that to me. This is sort of Friedrich Hayek's conception.