Thoughts on Jean Paul Sartre

I read Sartre after becoming acquainted with Descartes' philosophy, that "I" am identified with my thoughts (the famous I think therefore I am). Sartre offers not just a guide to live ones own life but I think a totally new way of viewing philosophy, which goes beyond the cogito. I am not my thoughts, thoughts being for Descartes all that can be certain to exist. Thoughts exist for sure, but they in no way prove that I exist as existence in Sartre's phrase precedes essence. Consciousness is always consciousness of something, something which exists. Descartes described the self as that which doubts, affirms, denies, and chooses. There was a missing step in the cogito, that having thoughts is something that belongs to consciousness. The act of doubting presupposed there is something to doubt. In that sense consciousness is only the act of willing which lies behind doubt, affirmation, and denial. The "I" is not defined by existence but by the choices made in regard to existence. Therefore we are free to choose the meaning of our own existence. This of course means that existence is independent of our consciousness and is meaningless. 

Sartre's transcendence of Descartes' ego came first through through the concept of intentionality, formulated by Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl, that thought is always about something. The knowledge of the phenomenal or empirical world is in terms of subjective awareness and not from a passive standpoint. Using this framework, Sartre argues that there isn't such a thing as human nature. The essence of what is human is chosen by us, but always in regard to existence. Because of this the act of defining our own existence also defines the existence of others. The self is mediated through the other. Through our actions we have a responsibility not only for our own meaning but for those of everybody else. This point I did not realize before reading Existentialism is a Humanism and answers the Marxist charge Sartre alludes to that existentialism cuts ourselves off from our fellow humans and engages us in egocentric contemplation, the same trap Descartes got us into with the cogito. This central point is what I think makes Sartre's lecture a success. Existentialism is a humanism.

Where I don't think Sartre is successful is proving of libertarian free will, the subject of Being and Nothingness, which is central to his ethical claims. Basically, Sartre argues that consciousness or "being-for-itself" is essentially nothing. Nothing is the absence of the being-in-itself which consciousness is aware of. It's absence only makes sense (as how can there "be" nothing) if consciousness imagines there is something there when there is not. Consciousness is purely negative, it's power is to negate being, which I guess is where the concept of identity come from. So we create the meaning in our lives out of pre-existing consciousness by some kind of selective awareness, which I guess we choose. Okay. Where I fall off the wagon is how the negatory power of consciousness to selectively choose being can actually affect anything in the world of being-in-itself. This in other words is similar to the interaction problem which plagues dualism. If mind is not physical or just being-in-itself, then how on earth does mind have causal relationships with the physical world in which it inhabits? Even if mind is free to cogitate as it wills, I don't see a necessary connection between this and having the ability to change the world. I see it this way: I don't control my body all of the time, I don't consciously control the beating of my heart or my digesting of food. Yet the sensations from this activity impinge on my thoughts, and I have no control of the fact that I have these sensations. In what way am I free if I don't control much of anything, assuming that being-for-itself has causal relations with being-in-itself? I can control pretty little during the time I am awake. 

An even greater challenge is the possibility of epiphenomenalism, that consciousness is not physical but itself does not cause anything in the physical world. Even if consciousness isn't physical or part of being-in-itself, everything about my physical body which I think I have causal power over can be explained in terms of physical causes. That I am writing this review can be explained by the observable behavior of my hands inputting what the neurons in my brain are firing off from memories of reading Existentialism is a Humanism. No consciousness, no being-for-itself needed to explain the behavior of writing this review. This sounds absurd, but is a possible explanation for how a dualist ontology could work, which is what I think Sartre leads us to. This would put his ethical position in a weird place. I can determine the meaning of life mentally, but I don't know if I can act on it, unless I do and hopefully it'll align with my desires. Sartre does say that we must live without hope if we choose the meaning of our lives.

"As for “despair,” the meaning of this expression is extremely simple. It merely means that we limit ourselves to a reliance upon that which is within our wills...For there is no God and no prevenient design, which can adapt the world and all its possibilities to my will. When Descartes said, 'Conquer yourself rather than the world,' what he meant was, at bottom, the same – that we should act without hope."
-Jean Paul Sartre
This sounds very stoic to me. That we ought to live unconcerned with things out of our control, body and reputation, and limit desire to what is in our control.

This however could make life even more absurd when paired with Sartre's radical freedom. At least the stoics had natural law and were determinists. If I choose the meaning of my life regardless of external circumstances, I'll have to have a very strong will. This undermines existentialism as a social philosophy and does make it more an egocentric endeavor and less a political humanism since it is possible that I cannot act out the meaning I will for my life as an example to others.